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ROBERT S. SUMMERS 
REPLY TO MR MACKIE 
I thank Mr John Mackie for his helpful comments. In general, I 
accept his summary of my main theses at the beginning of his 
comments. I will take up his criticism point by point. In this res- 
ponse, the Arabic numerals correspond to the same sections in Mr 
Mackie's comments. 
2. I cited the cases of Butterfield v. Forrester and Maki v. Frelk to 
illustrate a point. I noted that the court in the second case - the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1968 - followed the so-called rule of 
Butterfield v. Forrester that contributory negligence is a complete 
bar, even though the latter rule may well be the harshest doctrine 
known to the common law. I suggested that one likely explanation 
for the Illinois court's adherence to this doctrine was that some of 
the judges of the Illinois court may have harbored a working con- 
ception of the law as pre-existing rule and have become obsessed 
with this notion. Mr Mackie does not deny this possibility, yet it 
was the main point of my illustrative use of these cases. 
I was not, at this point, using the illustration to show the pos- 
sible "demerits of a rule conception of law in general." Of course, 
it is partly by assembling such particular instances that one might 
show such "demerits in general." Mr Mackie says that it is "preju- 
dicial and unfair of [me] to use as [my] one example a bad, exces- 
sively simple, old, and largely abandoned rule." I agree that the 
rule is bad, but this in fact supports me, for it indicates that some- 
thing of importance is at stake. I agree that the rule is excessively 
simple, but we have many such simple rule formulations in the 
books, a state of affairs attributable in part, I believe, to an 
excessive rule-mindedness - to over-reliance upon a "rules" wor- 
king conception. I concede that the so-called rule of Butterfield 
v. Forrester is largely abandoned today. Its abandonment by any 
Law and Philosophy 1 (1982) 303-314. 0167-5249/82/0012-0303 $01.20 
Copyright ? 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. 
Robert S. Summers 
form of legal action has been exceedingly slow, however. Only 
four American states abandoned it by judicial action (and no 
English court did so). It remains very much alive in some Amer- 
ican states. Yet it has been said that we are talking here of the 
harshest doctrine known to the common law. 
3. Mr Mackie says that he finds some obscurity in my notion of a 
working conception. He asks: "Is it a conception of the legal sys- 
tem as a whole, or a conception of the job of a court of law?" 
A working conception as I conceive it is neither a conception of 
the legal system as a whole nor a full conception of the job of a 
court of law. It is a conception a judge holds of some "recurrent 
normative phenomena of the law." I repeat the list of features (all 
of which may recur in cases for decision) I gave in my paper: 
(a) pre-existing rules, 
(b) actual reasons for those rules, 
(c) equities between the parties outside any relevant rules, 
(d) discretionary judgment (including that involved in the overruling 
or modification of precedent), 
(e) the bearing of ideas of justice and the common good characteris- 
tically found in some forms of law, 
(f) the general dictates of reasons, including "goal" reasons and 
"rightness" reasons, relevant to the justification of judicial deci- 
sions, and 
(g) fiat. 
I have singled out a rule conception as a viable judicial working 
conception. (It derives partly from the rules feature.) I have singled 
out a reason conception in this way, too. I do not claim that there 
is a corresponding viable working conception for all features on 
this list, however. Note that all phenomena on the list may be 
classed as justificatory resources - resources by reference to which 
a judge may, as appropriate, decide a case. (Note, too, that I am 
not saying that a judge who holds a "rules" working conception 
must believe that the whole of the law consists of a fixed body of 
pre-existing rules.) 
Mr Mackie also refers to a working conception as "the best des- 
cription of the job of each court in each particular case." But this, 
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too, is not my characterization. The best description of the total 
job of a judge would include taking into account (appropriately) 
all recurrent general phenomena of the law - all justificatory 
resources - that bear on the case. In my scheme of thought, a 
working conception is a conception of one type of such phenom- 
ena considered in some appropriate sense to be primary. 
Mr Mackie suggests that a conflict between working conceptions 
cannot arise if the rival conceptions are of the legal system as a 
whole. In my view, however, a conflict is possible even if the con- 
ceptions are of the legal system as a whole. It will not do (as Mr 
Mackie seems to try to do) to legislate away any possibility of con- 
flict between working conceptions of the law as a whole by hypothe- 
sizing a system in which the only function of courts is to apply rules 
made by a legislature duly concerned with reason. I did not, how- 
ever, pursue this in my original paper, for there I address rival work- 
ing conceptions of general features of legal phenomena that recur 
in cases and bear on the decisional and justificatory tasks ofjudges. 
4. Contrary to one of my theses, Mr Mackie says that a working 
conception with its narrow focus on some recurrent general 
feature of legal phenomena is not a pragmatic necessity for most 
judges. He says judges can and should be aware of all recurrent 
general phenomena of the law when deciding cases. Now, I do not 
deny that a judge can and should be aware of all the various types 
of justificatory legal resources that the case involves. I do not 
support my pragmatic necessity thesis on the ground that a judge 
cannot be aware of all such phenomena. Nor do I (any longer, at 
least for now) try to support that thesis on the ground that a judge 
can cope with only one kind of recurrent general feature of the 
phenomena at a time. (It may be that he could simply take each 
feature as it comes, so to speak.) 
I will now briefly try to support the pragmatic necessity thesis 
with something new, though I confess that I cannot myself get 
hold of it very well, and in the end it may not do. There is more to 
the story than the illustrative list of recurrent general features of 
legal phenomena I have set forth. There is also a problem of the 
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relation between these phenomena. I believe the adoption of a 
working conception signifies an assignment of primacy to the 
feature involved in light of such factors as its authoritative place 
within the system, its intrinsic justificatory significance, the 
regularity of its recurrence, and so on. It is not for nothing that a 
judge has a working conception. Such a conception enables him to 
cope far more readily (and more efficiently) with the complexity 
of the relations between instances of legal phenomena that recur 
in the cases. It provides a kind of tentative "fix" or ordering of 
those relations which he may bring to each case. Thus if he 
harbors a rule conception this signifies that he accords a kind of 
provisional primacy to rules as justificatory resources compared to 
the other recurrent general phenomena of law. He assumes that 
this fix or ordering serves him well. It may even seem to "decide" 
a high proportion of cases for him. A judge without any such (rule 
or other) working conception is left to work out this matter of 
primacy ad hoc in each case. Of course, for the above-average or 
unusually gifted judge, this may not prove a difficult matter. But 
for many judges it may not be too much to say that a working 
conception is, on the foregoing ground, a pragmatic necessity. This 
is all I now have to offer to support the pragmatic necessity thesis, 
and I agree that the matter calls for further exploration. 
But let us suppose I am wrong that a working conception is a 
pragmatic necessity for most judges. If my interpretation of the 
evidence is correct, it nonetheless remains true that many judges 
do in fact approach the decision of cases with a working concep- 
tion in mind. If this be so, then it remains important to inquire 
into the nature of these conceptions and into whether there are 
grounds for preferring any one possibility (including ones I have 
not considered here). 
Note that judicial reliance on working conceptions might be 
explained on a variety of bases: the simple truth that certain types 
of justificatory legal phenomena tend to be more recurrent than 
others; the normative predominance of some phenomena over 
others; deep psychological leanings, e.g., the desire for the certain- 
ty that rules seem to bring, etc. Note that Mr Mackie assumes that 
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on my account of the matter only one feature of relevant legal 
phenomena is ever brought into focus - that embodied in the wor- 
king conception. But I stated in my paper that this is not so. The 
feature that the working conception brings into focus may be dis- 
positive of the case, but then it may not be, too. And the judge 
may end up focusing on other justificatory phenomena. Thus I am 
not saying we must ultimately choose between a system of rules 
and a system of reason. I am saying there are different possible 
working conceptions and that one may be preferable to others. 
5. Mr Mackie thinks that if I opt for his proposed interpretation 
of my allegedly ambiguous claims, namely, that a working concep- 
tion must be addressed not to the legal system as a whole but to a 
feature of recurrent legal phenomena from the point of view of a 
particular court, then this interpretation will fail, as he puts it, to 
fit other parts of my text. His proposed interpretation is in fact 
the one I intend. And my text is not inconsistent. 
In another part of my text I contended that a working concep- 
tion of the law as reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considera- 
tions meets one of the criteria for a viable working conception, 
namely that its scope and potential applicability to particular cases 
is sufficient. I went on to say that this conception may even be the 
most wide-ranging of candidates. But I fail to see how this is 
inconsistent with construing my working conception as addressed 
to a feature of recurrent legal phenomena from the point of view 
of a court in particular cases. On the contrary, if some degree of 
reasoned reconciliation were not a sufficiently common feature of 
the materials that judges confront from case to case, it could 
hardly serve as a viable working conception. Thus when I say that 
the reason conception is wide-ranging, I do not mean that it is 
actually a conception of the system as a whole. I am, for one thing, 
saying that it ranges over - is applicable in some way to - other 
recurrent features of legal phenomena relevant in cases for 
decision. For example, it figures in rules and exceptions thereto. It 
figures in exercises of discretion. It figures in the formulation and 
application of equitable ideas, and so on. 
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A reason conception is wide-ranging in a further yet related way 
without being what Mr Mackie calls a conception of the system as 
a whole. Unforeseen considerations are always cropping up in par- 
ticular cases. On the reason conception, the judge is a kind of 
sentry whose duty it is to "be there" to take appropriate account 
of such considerations. 
A reason conception is wide-ranging in the still further sense 
that it ranges over highly varied institutional, processual, and other 
sociological structures of the [aw. This, too, is not to be equated 
with a conception of the system as a whole. 
Finally, a reason conception is wide-ranging in the sense that it 
is not confined to the law's experience with any narrow class of 
social relations. 
6. Under the heading of "Comparative Serviceability," I argued in 
favor of a reason over a rule working conception on the ground 
that the reason conception is more congenial to a rationale-oriented 
method of interpreting legal materials. I do not stop to go into the 
complexities of interpretation, but Mr Mackie, unlike a great many 
English and American judges of the past, agrees with me that a 
reason conception is more congenial in this way. But he says if 1 
allow that a rule conception may also include the reasons for the 
rules then there is really no ground here for choosing the reason 
conception over this (more sophisticated) rule conception, and he 
notes that I acknowledge that one rival in the field is in fact a 
"rule with reasons" working conception. 
To this I have two responses. First, I believe that a significant 
proportion of judges who appear to harbor a rules working con- 
ception simply do not incorporate into their conception the 
actual reasons for the rules as well. Thus, in regard to such judges, 
the difference between the two conceptions, and my ground for 
preferring the reason conception, remain real. 
Second, it is not clear to me that if a rule conception also incor- 
porates the actual reasons for those rules, then the reason concep- 
tion and the rule conception must necessarily collapse into one 
another (in this respect). For example, a judge who works with a 
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"rule with its reasons" conception may believe that, if the evidence 
as to reasons is ambivalent (as it not uncommonly is), he may 
either fall back on the merely literal import of the language of 
the materials or may regard himself free simply to substitute his 
own personal views. On the other hand, neither of these possibili- 
ties follows from harboring a reason conception as such. 
Moreover, there is, beyond ambivalence of actual reasons, a 
further matter. A rule plus its actual reasons even when not ambiv- 
alent is still not to be equated with a reason conception. The possible 
available reasons may go beyond or be different from those 
embodied in the rule or "attached" thereto. On the reason concep- 
tion, the judge would be more readily led to these and thus be 
more inclined to discard the rule (rather than adhere to it, as in 
Maki v. Frelk). Or there might be new and better reasons for the 
rule than its original ones. On a reason conception, the judge 
would more readily resort to these (as he should). Not only would 
this be likely to lead him to uphold the rule; it might also enable 
him to interpret and apply it better, in light of these new and 
better reasons. 
I argued in my original paper in favor of a working conception 
of the law as a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations 
on two further grounds: (1) much pre-existing law does not con- 
sist of rules; and (2) often there is no relevant pre-existing law so 
that it must be made up in light of reason as we go along. Now, Mr 
Mackie says that these two grounds "seem incompatible." He seems 
to assume that if I allow for any general type of pre-existing non- 
rule law, this may somehow commit me to the proposition that all 
the law pre-exists for all possible cases, and that therefore there 
cannot be any genuinely new issues, any actual "cases of first im- 
pression" (as lawyers say), or the like. 
But I do not see why this should be so. Let me take merely one 
type of example familiar to lawyers. Case law as well as statute law 
sometimes confers broad discretion to be exercised by judges on a 
case-by-case basis in light of criteria at least partially specified. I 
call this non-rule law, although specific rules may over time 
emerge from some of the exercises of discretion. Yet even within 
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the fields that such non-rule law addresses, relatively novel issues 
may arise for which, in my view, this non-rule law provides no 
determinate solutions. But for my point to hold, it is enough that 
such issues may arise outside these fields, too. 
I think I know what influences Mr Mackie here. A contemporary 
legal philosopher known to him (and to me) has ably contended 
that there are forms of non-rule law that "occupy the whole" and 
thus predetermine (and uniquely so) very nearly all questions. But 
it is enough for my purposes to note that there are various forms 
of non-rule law, some of which are not of this allegedly all-encom- 
passing character. 
The contemporary legal philosopher to whom Mr Mackie alludes 
sees the law as almost wholly pre-existing (and uniquely deter- 
minative at that). Mr Mackie takes me to task for not addressing 
this view as a possible working conception. In defense, let me say 
this. My own topic grew out of my work with judges in "con- 
tinuing judicial education seminars," as they are called in America. 
At no time, in a substantial number of those seminars, did I ever 
encounter a judge who appeared to hold as a working conception 
the view that for almost every issue that arises there is almost 
always controlling pre-existing law, and law that provides a single 
right answer at that. At the same time, it is a rare judge who holds 
that judges do not and ought not to make any law. Even the most 
conservative judges readily recognize that they some-imes must 
and do make law; for law may have to be remade because originally 
in error or now obsolete, law may be conflicting and thus call for 
choice, issues of first impression arise, and so on. On the other 
hand, I have in those seminars met many judges who, it seemed 
to me, hold one or the other of the two basic working concep- 
tions I address in my paper. Of course, I concede that the best 
working conception for the usual judge might be something differ- 
ent from either of these. I really only wanted to consider these 
two widely held ones (if I am right on my facts). I suspect, too, 
that the contemporary legal philosopher to whom Mr Mackie 
alludes would not be happy to have his stimulating and instructive 
theory downgraded to the status of a mere working conception. 
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(I add, for the record, that my conception of "goal reasons" is 
not to be equated with "public policy reasons" and thus my "goal 
reasons" are not severely restricted in their scope in the way "policy 
reasons" may be.) 
7. Under the head of "normative side effects" I set out to explore 
what some of the side effects of harboring one working concep- 
tion rather than another might be, and to consider whether one is 
preferable to the other on this score. I suggested that rule-minded 
judges will tend to go in for rules as such and that reason-minded 
judges will tend to go in for reason as such. I tried to put the 
general case for the importance of rules as strongly as I could and I 
tried to do the same for the importance of reason. 
Mr Mackie says that in this part of my paper I put the cart 
before the horse. He says that "Prior to the question 'What wor- 
king conception will be best for the judges to have?' is the ques- 
tion 'What sort of a legal system do we want to have?"' Now I am 
not sure what, if anything, is at stake here. I agree with Mr Mackie 
on the priority question. But I do not see how it would follow 
from this that I have put the cart before the horse. My topic is 
working conceptions of "the law," and in the course of treating 
it, I have (partially) addressed Mr Mackie's prior question. 
Now we turn to more substantive matters, but still under the 
heading of the comparative value of the rule conception and the 
reason conception in light of what I call normative side effects. 
First, there is a point of some importance on which Mr Mackie 
appears to have misunderstood me, though this may be my fault. 
He suggests that I advocate a system in which the law consists 
largely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliations by particular courts with 
few or no rules. But I do not say this. What I do say is that if 
judges generally harbor a reason conception, this is likely to bring 
more reason into the law's content than would be the case if 
judges generally harbor a rule conception. Judges working with a 
reason conception would, among other things, be constantly 
looking for opportunities to bring substantive reasons to bear both 
within and beyond the province of pre-existing rules. This would 
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be one general ground for preferring a reason conception. But in 
saying this I am not committed to favoring a system of law that 
consists solely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliations of particular 
courts. Nor does it follow that a reason conception carried to its 
logical end would give us a system of law consisting solely of ad 
hoc single-instance reconciliations. It just is the reasonable thing, 
for example, to have some rules, and reason will show us that too. 
Second, there is a further and related point of some importance 
on which Mr Mackie seems to have misunderstood me, though 
again this may be my fault. He suggests that I think "the best way 
to get reasoned content into the law as a whole is to encourage 
particular courts to work mainly by explicitly trying to reconcile 
conflicting considerations for themselves." Again, I did not say 
this. I said we are likely to get more substantive reason out of a 
reason conception than out of a rule conception as such. I speak 
here only of working conceptions. A working conception (used 
rationally) leaves a place for all the phenomena of the law, in- 
cluding rules. 
Third, let me say straightaway, however, that if I were faced 
with the false choice between what Mr Mackie calls a system con- 
sisting "largely of fairly stable rules" on the one hand, and a sys- 
tem consisting "largely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliation by par- 
ticular courts" on the other hand, I would, without knowing more, 
be inclined to opt for the latter. Fairly stable rules may be utterly 
devoid of rightness and goodness. It is, I think, somewhat more 
implausible to suppose that ad hoc reasoned reconciliations by 
particular courts may be similarly devoid of rightness and good- 
ness. Let us not assume that everyone is morally haywire. Let us 
take Anglo-American societies. One (but not the only) argument 
for my position here would be that, in such a society with a legal 
system consisting of ad hoc reasoned resolutions, each decision 
would have to be publicly justified on its own terms. Comparable 
problems governed by rule would all be settled in advance in one 
relatively short rule-creative moment. Such "rule" law would thus 
not be continuously tested case after case. Yet we know that, 
among other things, law becomes obsolete as social conditions 
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change. Processes of ad hoc reasoned reconciliation stand ready to 
take account of such factors. Furthermore, a bad ad hoc decision 
is confined in its effect to the parties at hand; not so, a rule. But 
of course, as I have said before, no choice is required between a 
system obsessed with rules and one obsessed with reason. I have 
pursued this merely because Mr Mackie seems quite certain that, as 
between the two, a "rule" system would be preferable. 
Fourth, I suspect Mr Mackie and I do differ in ouriperceptions 
of the need to improve the quality of substantive law through the 
injection of reason (by whatever means). He suggests I would be 
hard pressed to find very many examples of bad law (whether in 
rule form or other). He notes twice in his comments that I cite 
only one example of bad law and notes that I admit that even that 
one is now being overhauled. Without undertaking the tedious task 
of citing chapter and verse, let me assure him that at least in 
America the law is not so well off as all that. This is not to say 
that very much of it is now evil (though that, too, was so only a 
very few years ago). It is to say that, through reason, there is con- 
siderable scope, in America at least, for the improvement of the 
substantive law. 
8. Mr Mackie says it would "be better to ensure, as far as possible, 
that judges do not become obsessed with any working conception, 
than to speculate about which conception, if they do become ob- 
sessed with it, will do less harm." With this much I agree. But it 
does not follow that it is of no importance so to speculate. If I am 
right, judges do become obsessed with their working conceptions 
(I note that philosophers write about rule worship). It is not 
evident to me that the consequences of these obsessions may not 
vary significantly, depending on the conception involved. I know 
of no way to prevent obsessions, but it may be possible to induce 
judges to opt for the working conception that causes the least 
havoc when it is known that some proportion of judges will 
become preoccupied with whatever working conception they 
happen to hold. 
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In conclusion, I want to address briefly an important assumption I 
find running through Mr Mackie's comments. The theme is that in 
the best justified division of legal labor in a modern system of law, 
rules are to be made and changed largely by the legislature and 
only occasionally (and then only "perhaps") by the highest courts. 
If this be assumed, then what Mr Mackie says against my position 
in his Section 7 may be somewhat more plausible. But again I am 
not ready to grant Mr Mackie his assumption about the best divi- 
sion of legal labor. First, there is always genuine scope for com- 
mon law. (Where, incidentally, did it come from?) Many lawyers, 
liberal and conservative, would even agree that some kinds of mat- 
ters are better left to judges than to legislatures. It strikes me as far 
from obvious that the work of legislatures is generally well reasoned 
and defensible, or even that it is regularly better in quality than 
law made by judges. Moreover, I do not see why all judge-made 
law must be viewed as undemocratic. Second, I have always found 
it difficult to understand why in recent times there should have 
been, in the English system, such unwillingness to overrule preced- 
ent. The common law is not always sound when made. I do not 
think Butterfield v. Forrester was rightly decided at the time. 
Moreover, change takes its toll even on common law which was 
sound when made. Why should not the courts have responsibility 
for some - perhaps most - genuine common law renovation that 
does not pose controversial issues on which political parties divide 
(and that would otherwise be appropriate)? And would the House 
of Lords be able to do a better job in such cases if it had before it 
arguments pro and con from the courts below? Of course, there 
are many complexities here, and I have been able to touch on only 
a few of them. 
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